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Firms and apprentices have conflicting interests with respect to the content of training programmes. 
On the basis of a model for the investment decision in occupation-specific and generic training, I will 
show that, in the case of imperfect competition, firms are not only unwilling to pay for generic 
training, they also want this component to be as low as possible because it decreases their expected 
returns to occupation-specific training. Therefore the generic component of the training will be below 
the social optimum. This underinvestment problem cannot always be solved by having the generic 
component fixed at the social optimum by an external training body. Fixing the generic component 
may negatively affect the level of occupation-specific training and decrease social welfare. 
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In many industrialised countries, the apprenticeship system is an important route to prepare
young people for the labour market. A well-known example is, of course, Germany where about
60% of all young people enter an apprenticeship (see Steedman (1993), Soskice (1994) and Casey
(1986)). But also in the smaller European countries, such as Austria, Switzerland, Denmark
and to a lesser extent, the Netherlands, and in Australia, the apprenticeship system is relatively
strong (see for example Smits and Stromback (2001)). In Britain, the apprenticeship system
has declined sharply since the late 1960s, but there has been a renewed interest in occupation-
oriented workplace training for young people during the last decades, resulting in the launch of
the ’Modern Apprenticeship’ in 1993 (Gospel (1994) and Gospel (1998)).
The advantages of the apprenticeship system are manifold. Besides the didactic advantages
that workplace training may have (see for example Jacobs and Jones (1995), Rothwell and
Kazanas (1994) and Nieuwenhuis and Onstenk (1994)), it also ensures a close match between
acquired and required skills. Firms know better than schools which skills are needed for a
speciﬁc occupation. They will respond faster to technological developments in a trade. The
apprentice thus acquires skills that are actually demanded by ﬁrms. A potential risk of the
apprenticeship system is, however, that the training is too narrow compared to what would
be socially desirable because the training interests of ﬁrms will not always coincide with the
training interests of apprentices. This is the subject of this paper.
The main part of apprenticeship training is usually occupation-speciﬁc. The apprentice
learns to cut hair, do carpentry work or to print. The returns to occupation-speciﬁc training
are, however, to some extent uncertain (Blossfeld (1991)). If the demand for hairdressers falls,
the newly qualiﬁed hairdresser will face serious diﬃculties in ﬁnding a job and he/she may
end up in a diﬀerent occupation. The investment in hairdresser’s skills is then lost. If he/she
also possesses skills and knowledge to function well in other occupations or that facilitate the
acquisition of new skills, part of the training investment can be recovered. Apprentices therefor
have an interest in acquiring not only skills that are speciﬁc to the occupation they are trained
for, but also some generic skills that have a wider applicability. Blechinger and Pfeiﬀer (2000)
show that in Germany, occupational mobility after an apprenticeship is quite high, with circa
one third of workers with an apprenticeship degree changing occupation. At the same time,
”occupational change leads to a massive decline of the applicability of apprenticeship training”.
More than half of the workers who change occupation indicate that they cannot apply any of
the skills acquired during the apprenticeship. Blechinger and Pfeiﬀer (2000) therefore conclude
that the share of generic skills in apprenticeship training should increase.1
Examples of generic skills are academic skills such as reading, writing and Mathematics,
but also basic technical skills (for the latter, see also Bishop (1995)). In fact, what skills are
generic and what skills are occupation-speciﬁc also depends on the occupation concerned. Skills
speciﬁc for one occupation may be considered generic for another occupation. Furthermore, it
matters how broad a training occupation is deﬁned. For example, do we consider printers as one
occupation or do we consider oﬀset printers and screen printers as two diﬀerent occupations?
By deﬁnition, a broad occupation has more occupation-speciﬁc skills than a narrow occupation.
1More precisely, they refer to a special type of generic skills, namely key qualiﬁcations.
3Specialisation is inevitable, but given the uncertainty on the future demand for occupation-
speciﬁc skills, the apprentice will prefer that the training occupation is not too narrowly deﬁned.2
Of course, a balanced distribution of occupation-speciﬁc and generic skills is not only impor-
tant in apprenticeship programs but also for vocational education at schools. But the essential
diﬀerence is that the core part of apprenticeship training takes place on the work ﬂoor in ﬁrms.
This may have many didactic and economic advantages but the other side of the coin is that
training ﬁrms have little interest in providing apprentices with more training than is needed to
function well in the ﬁrm. If it is up to the employer to decide, apprentices will learn few skills
that are not speciﬁc to the occupation they are trained for. Furthermore there is a risk that
the training occupation will be too narrowly deﬁned. An occupation demands a wide range
of occupation-speciﬁc skills but in many ﬁrms, only a subset of these skills is needed. It is
therefore dangerous to leave the decision as to the content of the training programme entirely
to the ﬁrms. The problem is hardly mitigated if training decisions are made at the industry
level. Oulton and Steedman (1994) argue that the content of the British Youth Training pro-
grammes is too occupation-speciﬁc due to the fact that employers have a dominant inﬂuence on
the curriculum. Heijke, Borghans, and Smits (2001) argue that in the Netherlands industrial
bodies that develop training programmes tend to overestimate the importance of skills that are
needed in the sector but do not suﬃciently take into account the occupational mobility after
the apprenticeship that demands more generic skills. Although the generic training component
in German training programs is relatively large compared to other countries (Oulton and Steed-
man (1994)) and eﬀorts have been made over the last few decades to broaden the curriculum
(Blossfeld (1991)), the problem exists even in Germany, as is shown by Blechinger and Pfeiﬀer
(2000).
Other evidence on this issue is presented by Jonker (2001), who compared job performance,
wages and career perspectives of auditors educated through a dual track and full-time educated
auditors. She found that job performance of dual-track educated auditors was slightly better but
that wages were in general lower. Furthermore, both job mobility and occupational mobility
are much lower among dual-track educated auditors. This is an indication that dual-track
educated auditors acquire more speciﬁc but less generic skills than full-time educated auditors.
She therefore concludes that graduates from dual tracks should have ”a comparable amount
of general human capital as the graduates from full-time education”. The problem here is, of
course, that ﬁrms that train auditors through the dual-track system have little incentive to
increase the level of generic training.
In the economic literature on training, conﬂicting interests of apprentices and ﬁrms with
respect to the content of the training programme receive little attention. It is acknowledged
that ﬁrms tend to pay too much attention to ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills (see Askildsen and Ireland
(1993)), but the distinction between generic and occupation-speciﬁc skills is never made. Using
a Beckerian framework, the distinction between occupation-speciﬁc and generic skills would be
superﬂuous. Both types of skills can be used in external ﬁrms and can therefore be classiﬁed
as general in the deﬁnition of Becker (1962), as opposed to (completely) ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills
2See also Schimmel (1998), who presents a theoretical model for the decision to acquire universal or speciﬁc
knowledge. Workers who choose universal education are able to work in more occupations and have a higher
probability of obtaining and keeping a job.
4that are only useful in the training ﬁrm. Training for general skills raises the market wages of
workers as much as their (marginal) productivity. The training ﬁrm cannot appropriate any of
the returns to general training and as a consequence will not be prepared to bear any of the
training costs either. Since it is the worker who receives the beneﬁts from training it is also the
worker who has to make the training investment. If we extend this argument to occupation-
speciﬁc and generic training, the conclusion will be that the ﬁrm will be indiﬀerent between
the two types of training, since both types of training only have beneﬁts for the apprentice.
As long as apprentices are not credit-constrained, they will choose the optimal level of both
occupation-speciﬁc and generic skills. The underlying assumption is, however, that the market
for both types of skills is perfectly competitive. As we will see, this assumption will not always
hold for occupation-speciﬁc skills.
Some skills may be of use outside the training ﬁrm, but only in a limited number of ﬁrms
or jobs. The usual properties for general training will not hold in this case. Stevens (1994)
therefore introduces the term transferable training. She states that general training is only
a special case of transferable training, which is characterised by perfect competition on the
market for skills. In the case of imperfect competition between ﬁrms on the labour market,
wages will not rise as much as the productivity of trained workers, which means that ﬁrms
can appropriate some of the returns to training. Firms therefore have an incentive to invest in
transferable training. However, not only the training ﬁrm, but also external ﬁrms will proﬁt
from the training. The training ﬁrm risks to lose its trained workers to other ﬁrms and will
therefore invest less than the social optimum. In practice, there will be quite a few occupations
that have only a limited market, especially those occupations that are linked very closely to
a speciﬁc sector of industry. Training for those occupations will then be transferable but not
general in the deﬁnition of Becker.
This paper concentrates on conﬂicting interests of ﬁrms and apprentices with respect to the
training level for occupation-speciﬁc and generic skills. I will develop a theoretical model for
the investment decision in both types of skills. I will show that, although it is socially optimal
to have a generic training component, ﬁrms are not only unwilling to pay for generic training,
they also want this component to be as small as possible, because it oﬀers the worker better
outside opportunities and forces ﬁrms in the training sector to pay higher wages. Therefore, the
generic component of training will be too small as long as the worker does not participate in
the training decision. Furthermore, this underinvestment problem cannot always be solved by
having an external training body ﬁx the generic component at the social optimum. Fixing the
generic component may negatively aﬀect the level of occupation-speciﬁc training and decrease
social proﬁts.
2 A model for occupation-speciﬁc and generic skills
I will now develop a model to investigate the optimal investment in occupation-speciﬁc and/or
generic skills and identify the circumstances which may hinder this optimal investment. In this
model there are two sectors, a training sector where all the training takes place and a non
training sector. Both occupation-speciﬁc and generic skills are transferable but each type of
skills has a diﬀerent market. Occupation-speciﬁc skills only have a value in the training sector.
5Examples of these skills are printing skills and hairdressing skills, but also some ICT skills,
such as programming skills. Firms in the training sector may operate on the same product
market. The training sector then corresponds to a speciﬁc sector of industry, for example
the printing industry, but this need not necessarily be the case, as the programmer’s example
shows. Generic skills, on the other hand, may have some value in the training sector but they
are especially useful outside the training sector. There are several reasons for this. Firstly,
generic skills that facilitate the acquisition of new skills, for example learning skills, once the
trade has been learned, are more important outside the training sector than inside the sector,
since a worker who moves to another sector has to acquire some new skills and knowledge to
function well, for example through learning by doing.3 Secondly, as mentioned above, it depends
on the occupation concerned which skills can be classiﬁed as occupation-speciﬁc and which as
generic. If an occupation is very narrowly deﬁned, skills that are generic for that occupation,
are probably occupation-speciﬁc for related occupations, as the example of the oﬀset and screen
printers shows. Although oﬀset printers may need some basic skills of screen printing, these
skills are particularly important when they switch occupations, for example to become screen
printers.
The mechanism of the model is as follows. The market for occupation-speciﬁc skills is
relatively small and therefore the value of the occupation-speciﬁc component of the training is
uncertain ex ante. Furthermore, due to (small) variations in production techniques between
ﬁrms and in talent between workers, this value may diﬀer between ﬁrms. So, it may happen
that occupation-speciﬁc training is worth more in some other ﬁrm in the training sector than
in the training ﬁrm. These properties give rise to imperfect competition for occupation-speciﬁc
skills. The market for generic skills is very large and is characterised by perfect competition.
As ﬁrms in the training sector have some monopsony power, the post-training wages of
workers in the training sector will be below their (marginal) productivity. For ﬁrms this wedge
between wages and productivity is an incentive for investing in occupation-speciﬁc training.
However, as will be shown, the value of generic training will put a lower bound on the skilled
wage rate in the training sector and therefore ﬁrms in the training sector want this training
component to be as low as possible.
The model presented in this paper is an extension of Stevens’ model for transferable training
(Stevens (1994)). Stevens showed that imperfect competition for transferable skills provides an
incentive for ﬁrms to invest in transferable training but at the same time fewer workers will
be trained than is socially optimal because the training ﬁrm, when maximising proﬁts, does
not take into account the part of the expected return that goes to external ﬁrms. My aim, on
the other hand, is to show that imperfect competition for occupation-speciﬁc skills endangers
the investment in skills with a wider applicability because generic training decreases the ﬁrm’s
expected return to occupation-speciﬁc training. The main diﬀerence between both models is
that Stevens considers only one type of transferable training while in my model there is a
distinction between two types of transferable training each of which has a diﬀerent market.
The occupation-speciﬁc component in my model is comparable to the transferable training
component in Steven’s model, the generic training component is new.
3There may be an overlap between the two sectors, as generic skills may be useful in some ﬁrms in the training
sector but in diﬀerent occupations. This will not aﬀect the results of the model.
62.1 The training programme
Training may take place in any ﬁrm in the training sector. There are n ﬁrms operating in
the training sector. The number of ﬁrms outside this sector is very large. Initially, there are
many identical untrained workers in the economy. Assuming constant returns to labour, I will
consider the training decision of a single ﬁrm and worker. The world lasts two periods. The
sequence of events is as follows: At the beginning of period one, it is decided how much training
the worker will receive. Training takes place during the ﬁrst period. During the second period,
the worker will work for the ﬁrm that oﬀers him the highest wages. This may be a ﬁrm in the
training sector or, alternatively, a ﬁrm outside the sector.
The training may consist of an occupation-speciﬁc part h that has only value in the training
sector and a generic part a that has some value in the training sector but the value outside the
training sector will in general exceed the value in the training sector. The value of occupation-
speciﬁc training is uncertain ex ante, because ﬁrms in the sector are subject to productivity
or demand shocks. There are two types of shocks, a sector-speciﬁc shock that aﬀects all ﬁrms
in the training sector in the same way and a ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock. If all ﬁrms in the training
sector operate on the same product market, an example of a sector-speciﬁc shock is a fall in the
demand for this product. But even if they operate on diﬀerent product markets they may be
subject to similar shocks since they demand the same skills and thus have to some extent similar
production techniques. So a sector-speciﬁc shock may also be caused by a rise in the price of
some means of production (other than labour) that is used by all ﬁrms in the training sector.
The actual value of occupation-speciﬁc training will diﬀer between ﬁrms due to ﬁrm-speciﬁc
shocks. These ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks reﬂect ex ante uncertainty in the match between the skills
needed in the ﬁrm and the skills the worker actually possesses. An occupation demands a range
of skills, but not all skills are equally important in all ﬁrms in the training sector. At the same
time, some workers will turn out to be better in one skill and others in other skills. It depends
on the relative importance of the various techniques in a ﬁrm and the talent of the worker, how
productive a trained worker will eventually be in a certain ﬁrm.
The ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks εi are independent and identically distributed with zero mean, ﬁnite
support [−¯ ε, ¯ ε] and continuous distribution and density functions F(.) and f(.). The sector-
speciﬁc shock η has support h−∞,∞i and continuous distribution and density functions G(.)
and g(.). The assumptions on the support of the sector-speciﬁc and ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks ensure
that there is always a positive chance that the worker will leave the training sector.
The productivity of a trained worker in a ﬁrm i in the training sector is given by:
˜ υi = h + (1 − δ)a + εi + η = υi + (1 − δ)a (1)
where δ is a measure for the usefulness of generic skills in the training sector, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. For
δ = 1 generic skills are of no use in the training sector and for δ = 0 generic skills are fully
usable in the training sector. It is supposed that generic skills can always be fully used outside
the training sector. The productivity of the worker in any ﬁrm outside the training sector is
thus given by a.
Training costs depend on the level of both occupation-speciﬁc and generic training. The cost




∂a > 0, ∂2C
∂a2 > 0. Also, there may be some interaction between h and a on the
7cost side. A higher level of generic skills (for example better reading skills) may facilitate the
learning process of occupation-speciﬁc skills. If such an interaction eﬀect exists, it is therefore
most likely negative, so I suppose that ∂2C
∂a∂h ≤ 0.
2.2 The social optimum
I will start by deriving the socially optimal levels of occupation-speciﬁc and generic training.
The social proﬁts of the training programme as a function of the level of occupation-speciﬁc
and generic training are equal to the diﬀerence between total returns and total costs:
Π(h,a) = R(h,a) − C(h,a) (2)
where R(h,a) represents the total expected return to training. To determine the total return,
recall that occupation-speciﬁc training only has a value if the worker remains in the training
sector, while generic training has the highest value if the worker leaves the sector. Deﬁne υ1 ≤
υ2 ≤ ··· ≤ υn as the order statistics corresponding to υ1,υ2,...,υn. Sector mobility is eﬃcient
if the worker’s productivity outside the training sector exceeds his maximum productivity in the
sector, that is ˜ υn < a ⇔ υn < δa. Perfect competition outside the training sector ensures that
the second period market wage outside the sector is given by ω = a. Furthermore, it is clear
that the wage that the worker will be oﬀered in the training sector will never exceed maximum
productivity, w2 ≤ υn + (1 − δ)a. So, for υn < δa we have w2 < a. The worker will then leave
the training sector. If, on the other hand, υn ≥ δa the ﬁrm in the training sector in which
the worker has the highest productivity will attract the worker and make positive proﬁts by
oﬀering a wage slightly above the worker’s highest alternative. Therefore we have for υn ≥ δa
that w2 ≥ a. The wage oﬀered in the training sector thus ensures that separation is always
eﬃcient, that is if υn < δa the worker leaves the training sector otherwise he stays and works
in the ﬁrm with the highest match. Note that the level of generic training ensures the worker
a certain minimum wage for the second period.
The expected total return is given by:
R = E[υn + (1 − δ)a|υn ≥ δa]Pr[υn ≥ δa] + aPr[υn < δa] (3)
and the probability that a worker will leave the training sector by:




Fn(δa − h − η)g(η)dη + G(δa − h − ¯ ε)
(4)
since for η < δa − h − ¯ ε the maximum productivity in the training sector is always below the
productivity outside the sector ( Pr[υn < δa|η < δa − h − ¯ ε] = 1). If the sector-speciﬁc shock
is suﬃciently small, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock has no eﬀect on the probability of moving. The
probability of moving is decreasing in h and increasing in a.
It can be shown that the marginal total return to occupation-speciﬁc training is equal to the
probability that the worker stays in the sector and the marginal total return to generic training
equal to the value of a unit of generic training in the training sector, 1 − δ, plus δ times the
8probability he moves to another sector4. Maximising social proﬁts (equation 2) with respect to
h and a, we ﬁnd that the socially optimal training levels (h∗,a∗) are the ones that provide
∂C
∂h
= Pr[υn ≥ δa] (5)
∂C
∂a
= 1 − δ + δPr[υn < δa] (6)
Note that if ε and η were both degenerate at zero and generic training only had value outside
the training sector (e.g. δ = 1), it would be socially optimal to specialise in the skill type that
can be acquired at the lowest cost.
How is this social optimum aﬀected by the size of the market? The higher the degree of
competition, the higher the probability that there is a ﬁrm in the training sector in which the




The probability of moving to another sector decreases with the size of the market. If the number
of ﬁrms in the training sector becomes very large, there is still a positive probability that the
worker will move.
lim
n→∞Pr[υn < δa] = G(δa − h − ¯ ε) (8)
So even if the number of ﬁrms in the training sector were very large and generic training had
no value in the training sector (e.g. δ = 1), it would be socially optimal for workers to learn
some generic skills.5
3 Private training decisions
The social optimum will only be reached if the social proﬁts coincide with the private proﬁts of
the agents who decide on training. How are the returns to training shared between the worker,
the training ﬁrm and the other ﬁrms in the training sector? To answer this question, we need to
know the worker’s second-period wage in the training sector. We know already that for υn ≥ δa
the worker will stay in the training sector and work for the ﬁrm with the highest match at a
wage w2, a ≤ w2 ≤ υn + (1 − δ)a. This ﬁrm will set the wage at the lowest value that makes it
possible to attract the worker. The actual wage therefore depends on υn−1 and a. If υn−1 ≥ δa
the second-period wage will be w2 = υn−1 + (1 − δ)a and if υn−1 < δa ≤ υn it will be w2 = a.6
Table 1 summarises the diﬀerent labour market outcomes.
The expected return to the worker Rw is given by:
Rw = E[υn−1 + (1 − δ)a|υn−1 ≥ δa]Pr[υn−1 ≥ δa]
+ aPr[υn−1 < δa]
(9)
4The derivation of the marginal total return is given in the appendix.
5As mentioned before this is due to the assumption that the sector-speciﬁc shock has no ﬁnite support while
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock has. The outcomes of the model are, however, not aﬀected by this assumption.
6Stevens (1994) shows that this is a Nash equilibrium.
9The total expected return to ﬁrms in the training sector:
Rf = E[υn − υn−1|υn−1 ≥ δa]Pr[υn−1 ≥ δa]
+ E[υn − δa|υn−1 < δa ≤ υn]Pr[υn−1 < δa ≤ υn]
(10)
Since there is no ﬁrm-speciﬁc training component, ex ante all ﬁrms in the training sector have
equal probability to employ the worker in the second period and the expected return for an
individual ﬁrm i is given by Rf/n. Note that the expected return to the training ﬁrm does not
exceed the expected return to any other ﬁrm in the training sector. The return to ﬁrms outside
the training sector is zero, because these ﬁrms pay the worker his full productivity.
An increase in the level of occupation-speciﬁc training increases the worker’s second-period
wage only if υn−1 ≥ δa. Unless δ = 0, an increase in the level of generic training is only fully
reﬂected in the wage rate if υn−1 < δa. For υn−1 ≥ δa the wage increase will be bounded by
the limited usefulness of generic skills in the training sector. The return to the ﬁrm, on the
other hand, is only aﬀected by a change in the level of occupation-speciﬁc or generic training
if υn−1 < δa ≤ υn. This conditional return increases in h and decreases in a. The expected
private marginal returns with respect to h and a are equal to: 7
∂Rw
∂h
= Pr[υn−1 ≥ δa] (11)
∂Rw
∂a
= 1 − δ + δPr[υn−1 < δa] (12)
∂Rf
∂h
= Pr[υn−1 < δa ≤ υn] (13)
∂Rf
∂a
= −δPr[υn−1 < δa ≤ υn] (14)
Note that, in contrast to Stevens (1994), part of the marginal beneﬁts of occupation-speciﬁc
training accrues to ﬁrms in the training sector. The reason for this is that in my model, due
to the option to work outside the training sector, an increase in the level of occupation-speciﬁc
training will not always lead to an increase in the worker’s second-period wage. Black and
Loewenstein (1997) and Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) obtain a similar result for a minimum-
wage guarantee for the post-training period given by the training ﬁrm. They show that if the
ﬁrm has to pay a certain minimum wage in the post-training period, it can increase its proﬁts by
7Theappendixprovidesthederivations.
productivity returns
υn υn−1 worker ﬁrm
υn < δa a 0
υn ≥ δa υn−1 < δa a υn − δa
υn ≥ δa υn−1 ≥ δa υn−1 + (1 − δ)a υn − υn−1
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Table1:Labourmarketoutcomesincreasing the productivity of the worker by just as much as is possible without increasing the
chance that the worker will leave the training ﬁrm. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) also show that
the existence of a minimum wage provides an incentive for ﬁrms to provide transferable training
to increase the worker’s productivity level to the level of the minimum wage. In this respect,
the outside option for the worker in our model, ω = a, acts as a minimum wage, but while in
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) this minimum wage is exogenously given, here it is endogenous
to the model as it depends on the level of generic training. As long as υn−1 < δa ≤ υn, the
worker stays in the training sector and the ﬁrm that employs him has to pay a wage equal to a,
in which case the conditional return increases in h. The marginal return to occupation-speciﬁc
training as a function of the level of generic training attains a maximum for some a ≥ 0. As the
level of generic training increases, the chance that the worker will be paid the minimum-wage
guarantee increases, but the chance that the worker will stay in the training sector decreases.
If the chance that the worker will stay in the training sector approaches zero, for example if a
becomes very large, the eﬀect of the minimum-wage guarantee on h diminishes. Note that for
δ = 0, the eﬀect of the outside option is independent of a. Generic training is worth just as
much in the training sector as outside the training sector, but the option to leave the training
sector still acts as a minimum-wage guarantee.
For δ > 0, the marginal return to generic training for the ﬁrms in the training sector is
negative. Given the level of occupation-speciﬁc training, an increase in the level of generic
training increases the outside option for workers more than their productivity in the training
sector and thus decreases the expected returns to ﬁrms.
The marginal private returns are clearly aﬀected by the size of the market. We have:
Pr[υn−1 < δa ≤ υn] =
Z ∞
δa−h−¯ ε
nFn−1(δa − h − η)
 
1 − F(δa − h − η)

g(η)dη (15)
It is easy to see that:
lim
n→∞Pr[υn−1 < δa ≤ υn] = 0 (16)
The marginal return to the ﬁrms in the training sector fades if n becomes very large. Further-
more, since




Pr[υn−1 < δa] = lim
n→∞
Pr[υn < δa] (18)
The private marginal beneﬁt of occupation-speciﬁc and generic training of the worker approaches
the social marginal beneﬁts if n becomes very large, which is the situation Becker (1964) refers
to.
In the following subsections, I will consider the training outcomes if (1) the training ﬁrm
and the worker decide jointly on training, (2) the training ﬁrm decides alone on the level of
training, and (3) the training levels are decided at the sector level.
3.1 The training ﬁrm and the worker decide jointly on training
Suppose that the training ﬁrm and the worker decide jointly on the levels of occupation-speciﬁc
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Comparing this private optimum with the social optimum given by (5) and (6), it is clear that
for ∂2C
∂a∂h = 0 and δ > 0 the level of generic training will be too high and the level of occupation-
speciﬁc training will be too low. The private marginal returns to occupation-speciﬁc training
are below the social marginal return while the private marginal return to generic training is
above the private marginal return. The reason for this is that the return to the other ﬁrms
in the training sector is not incorporated in the training decision. The worker always wants
more generic training than is socially optimal because the level of generic training puts a lower
bound on the wage he will be paid during the second period, irrespective of whether he stays in
the training sector or moves. For the same reason, the training ﬁrm wants to oﬀer less generic
training but since the ﬁrm only accounts for its own loss and not for the loss of external ﬁrms its
weight in the training decision is low compared to that of the worker. Furthermore, the worker
want less occupation-speciﬁc training than is socially optimal because it will only increase his
expected future wage if not only his maximum productivity (υn) exceeds his outside productivity
but also the second-best match (υn−1). If the second-best match does not exceed his outside
value, the extra returns accrue to the ﬁrm that will employ him. This latter result is in contrast
with Stevens’s model where, as mentioned before, the marginal beneﬁts of transferable training
fully accrue to the worker and, as a consequence, the choice of the level of occupation-speciﬁc
training is not directly aﬀected by the externality.8 This externality disappears if the number
of ﬁrms becomes very large since limn→∞ Pr[υn−1 ≥ δa] = limn→∞ Pr[υn ≥ δa]. For ∂2C
∂a∂h < 0
the underinvestment in h will be less severe since overinvestment in a will decrease the marginal
costs of h.
Note that for δ = 0, the expected wage increase is equal to the expected increase in pro-
ductivity, both within and outside the training sector. In that case, the private optimal level
of generic training will be equal to the social optimum if ∂2C
∂a∂h = 0 and will be below the social
optimum if ∂2C
∂a∂h < 0.
3.2 The training ﬁrm decides on training
Workers will only participate in the training decision if they share in the training costs. There
are circumstances in which workers are not able or not willing to do so. For example, if workers
are credit-constrained or if they have insuﬃcient information on the quality of the training (see
Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (1997) and Smits (1997)). If the training ﬁrm decides on
its own on the training level, no generic training will take place since training ﬁrms are only
interested in occupation-speciﬁc training. More precisely, the private optimum in this case is
given by:












(Pr[υn < δa] − Pr[υn−1 < δa]) (22)
Since the right-hand side of (22) is negative or zero and ∂C
∂a > 0, there is no internal solution
for a. A corner solution is given by a = 0. The training ﬁrm provides no generic training
since generic training lowers the expected future proﬁts of the training ﬁrm. Compared to the
social optimum, the level of occupation-speciﬁc training is aﬀected in three ways. Firstly, the
training ﬁrm does not allow for the expected parts of the returns to occupation-speciﬁc training
that accrue to other ﬁrms in the training sector(n−1
n (Pr[υn ≥ δa]−Pr[υn−1 ≥ δa])) and to the
apprentice (Pr[υn−1 ≥ δa]). This direct eﬀect is negative. Secondly, the level of generic training
indirectly aﬀects the level of occupation-speciﬁc training. The level of generic training acts as a
minimum-wage guarantee and given that ﬁrms in the training sector have to pay this minimum
wage, proﬁts can be increased by increasing the level of occupation-speciﬁc training. A decrease
in a may either increase or decrease the marginal return to occupation-speciﬁc training since
it lowers the minimum-wage guarantee but also leads to less sectoral mobility. Therefore, this
second eﬀect may be either positive or negative. It is negative if
Pr[υn ≥ 0] − Pr[υn−1 ≥ 0] < Pr[υn ≥ δa∗] − Pr[υn−1 ≥ δa∗]
This means that for a = a∗, there is a higher chance that a ﬁrm in the training sector will
employ the worker and pay the minimum-wage guarantee w2 = a than for a = 0. Note that
for δ = 0 this second eﬀect does not occur. In that case, the lower bound on the second-period
wages does not depend on the actual level of generic training. Thirdly, if ∂2C
∂a∂h < 0, there is
another indirect eﬀect of the level of generic training on the level of occupation-speciﬁc training.
Since a lower level of a increases the (marginal) costs of occupation-speciﬁc training, this eﬀect
is negative. The lower the level of generic training, the higher the marginal costs of occupation-
speciﬁc training. If the second eﬀect is positive and outweighs the ﬁrst and third eﬀect, the
private optimum for h will be above the social optimum, otherwise it will be below it.
From (21) it follows that if the number of ﬁrms in the training sector becomes very large, it
will be optimal not to provide any occupation-speciﬁc training at all. It is only proﬁtable for
the ﬁrm to provide occupation-speciﬁc training if competition is less than perfect.
3.3 Training levels are decided on at the sector level
Since all ﬁrms in the training sector may proﬁt from the training, the expected proﬁts for the
sector may increase if training decisions take place on the sector level. This situation is quite
common in several countries, notably in the Netherlands and to a lesser extent in Germany.
Suppose as before that workers do not pay for their training. Also suppose that there is a co-
ordinating body that ﬁrst decides on the level of training and then levies a training contribution
of 1
nC(h,a) to all ﬁrms in the training sector. Firms that train are refunded the training costs.
So, all ﬁrms pay an equal amount of the costs of training workers, irrespective of where this
training takes place. The co-ordinating body decides on the training levels by maximising
13proﬁts at the sector level. The optimal levels of occupation-speciﬁc and generic training for the
training sector are given by:
∂C
∂h
= Pr[υn ≥ δa] − Pr[υn−1 ≥ δa] (23)
∂C
∂a
= δ(Pr[υn < δa] − Pr[υn−1 < δa]) (24)
Again, there is no internal solution for a and a corner solution is that no generic training
will be provided. The level of occupation-speciﬁc training is higher than in the case in which
each ﬁrm decides on its own on training levels since the expected proﬁts of all ﬁrms are now
taken into account in the training decision. Whether the level of occupation-speciﬁc training
will be below or above the social optimum, depends on the indirect eﬀect of a lower level
of a on h through the marginal returns to h and through the cost function. For ∂2C
∂a∂h = 0
the private optimal level of occupation-speciﬁc training will be above the social optimum if
Pr[υn ≥ 0] − Pr[υn−1 ≥ 0] > Pr[υn ≥ δa∗].
If the number of ﬁrms becomes very large, the returns to the training sector vanish. In that
case, all returns go to the workers and as a consequence it is not proﬁtable to ﬁnance training
on the sector level either.
3.4 Policy implications
Since private training decisions do not result in the socially optimal level of occupation-speciﬁc
and generic training, if competition is imperfect, we will now examine whether social proﬁts
can be increased by government intervention. I consider the situation in which ﬁrms are free
to decide on the level of occupation-speciﬁc training but the level of generic training is ﬁxed
by a social planner. Another course of action is to deprive the training sector of all inﬂuence
on the training programme and ﬁx both a and h at the socially optimal level. The training
sector will, however, have better insight in what skills are needed in the sector than a social
planner. Indeed, one of the advantages of the apprenticeship system is a close match between
the skills required and the skills acquired. It is not unlikely that a social planner simply lacks
good knowledge of h. Taking away all inﬂuence of ﬁrms may therefore have other disadvantages.
The point of departure is the situation in which training decisions are taken at the sector
level. In this case, no generic training will be provided and the level of occupation-speciﬁc
training will be either too high or too low compared to the social optimum, depending on the
indirect eﬀects of a lower a on h through the marginal return to h and through the cost function.
Now suppose that the level of generic training is exogenously ﬁxed by a social planner. What
is the optimal intervention level for a, that is what level of generic training will maximise social
proﬁts given that the level of occupation-speciﬁc training is determined at the sector level? The
private optimal level of occupation-speciﬁc training for the training sector as a function of the
level of generic training h(a) follows from equation (23). Substituting for h(a) in the social
proﬁt function (equation 6), and diﬀerentiating with respect to a, gives the ﬁrst-order condition
for the socially optimal level of a:
∂C
∂a










14substituting for equation (23) in (25) gives:
∂C
∂a
= 1 − δ + δPr[υn < δa] +
dh
da
Pr[υn−1 ≥ δa] (26)
The optimal intervention level of generic training ˆ a depends clearly on the sign of dh
da and
on ∂2C
∂a∂h. First suppose that ∂2C
∂a∂h = 0. Then for dh
da < 0 the optimal intervention level of generic
training is below the social optimum, ˆ a < a∗ and for dh
da > 0 it is above the social optimum
ˆ a > a∗. If the level of generic training does not aﬀect the level of occupation-speciﬁc training,
that is, if dh
da = 0, the external body should set the level of generic training equal to the social
optimum, ˆ a = a∗. This is always the case if δ = 0, that is, if generic training has the same value
within the training sector as outside the training sector.
If ∂2C
∂a∂h < 0, intervention is even more complicated. In that case, we have ˆ a < a∗ even for
dh
da = 0. If dh
da > 0, the optimal intervention level of generic training may be above or below the
social optimum, depending on the size of both indirect eﬀects of a on h.
So, for government intervention to be successful, we need a good insight in the diﬀerent eﬀects
of intervention. Intervention on the generic component of training will aﬀect sectoral mobility
and wages after the training and therefore has an indirect eﬀect on the level of occupation-
speciﬁc training as well. Higher sector mobility will discourage investments in occupation-
speciﬁc training while a higher minimum wage will encourage these investments. Which eﬀect
dominates depends on the cost function and on the distribution of the sector-speciﬁc and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc shocks. In general, it is not optimal to set the level of generic training simply at the
social optimum a∗. Any positive eﬀect of an increase in a on social proﬁts may then be oﬀset
by the decrease in h, in which case public intervention worsens the situation.
4 Discussion
In this paper, we considered two types of skills, occupation-speciﬁc skills, which only have a
value in one particular sector of Industry, and generic skills, which have a value in a number
of sectors. If the market for both types of skills were perfectly competitive, these could both
be classiﬁed as general in the deﬁnition of Becker. In that case, workers would pay the costs of
both types of training and choose the optimal mix of occupation-speciﬁc and generic training.
Things are diﬀerent, however, if the market for occupation-speciﬁc skills is limited. Imperfect
competition for occupation-speciﬁc skills gives monopsony power to ﬁrms in the training sector,
who can appropriate some of the returns to occupation-speciﬁc training. As a consequence, ﬁrms
in the training sector are prepared to bear part of the costs of occupation-speciﬁc training.
However, the expected returns to ﬁrms decrease with the level of generic training. This is
because the expected future wages that ﬁrms in the training sector have to pay increase more
with the level of generic training than the expected productivity of the workers. More generic
training thus directly lowers the expected proﬁts of ﬁrms in the training sector. So ﬁrms are
not only unwilling to pay for generic training, they also want this training component to be
as small as possible. It follows that ﬁrms and workers have opposite interests with respect to
generic training. Workers want more generic training than is socially optimal at a given level of
15occupation-speciﬁc training, while ﬁrms want less generic training. Private training decisions
will therefore generate either too little or too much generic training.
This model predicts that the apprenticeship system will ﬂourish especially in occupations
that have a strong link with a particular economic sector, such as carpenters and hairdressers.
Apprentices in these occupations learn skills that only have a value in the building industry or
in the hairdressing sector. Due to imperfect competition, ﬁrms in these sectors can appropriate
some of the returns to training and are therefore prepared to invest in apprenticeship training.
Furthermore, ﬁrms in these sectors are interested in co-ordinating their training activities. The
returns to training for an individual ﬁrm may not be very high, since a worker may quit to
work for another ﬁrm in the same sector, but for the sector as a whole they certainly are. On
the contrary, the apprenticeship system will do less well in occupations that have no strong
link with any particular economic sector, such as many administrative occupations, since these
occupations have a larger market. Firms that train apprentices for these occupations will not
share in the proﬁts. In the Netherlands, we see indeed that the apprenticeship system is well
represented in occupations that have a close link to a particular sector of industry, while the
apprenticeship system for administrative occupations has not been very successful, not in the
last place because the availability of apprenticeship places falls short of the demand and is of low
quality. Not surprisingly, full-time education is still the dominant trajectory for administrative
occupations.
But, as shown in this paper, a strong sector link will also have some disadvantages. Firms are
not prepared to supply training that is useful outside the sector of industry. An example is the
Dutch printing industry. Traditionally, the apprenticeship system is very well developed in this
branch of industry. With the digitisation of the production process, many skills needed in the
traditional printing industry are now also of use outside this industry in the so-called graphical
periphery (multimedia, copying, design, and advertising)(Teunen (1997)). As a consequence,
the returns to training for ﬁrms in the printing industry have declined and the number of
training places has fallen.
If decisions on the content of the training programme are taken on the sector level, there is a
risk that the training programme is too narrow and only aimed at the needs of the sector. The
policy implications of my model for the apprenticeship system are, however, not straightforward.
It is clear that the industry should not be free to set the entire training programme. However,
having the generic component of the training ﬁxed by an external body may have a negative
eﬀect on the size of the occupation-speciﬁc component, since it increases occupational mobility.
Public intervention will then lower social proﬁts. Intervention therefore demands a thorough
knowledge of the interaction eﬀects of generic and occupation-speciﬁc training.
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18A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the social and private marginal returns to training
Deﬁne ε1 ≤ ε2 ≤ ··· ≤ εn as the order statistics corresponding to ε1,ε2,...,εn. The distribution
functions of εn and εn−1 are given by Fn(.) = F(.)n and Fn−1(.) = F(.)n + nF(.)n−1 
1 − F(.)

and the density functions by fn(.) = nf(.)F(.)n−1 and fn−1(.) = n(n−1)f(.)F(.)n−2(1−F(.)).
The joint density of εn and εn−1 is given by fn,n−1(y,z) = n(n − 1)F(z)n−2f(z)f(y). The
probability of leaving the training sector is given by:











Fn(δa − h − η)g(η)dη + G(δa − h − ¯ ε)
and the probability that the worker remains in the training sector and earns wages equal to the
market wages outside the training sector is given by:
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Expected total returns to training are equal to:
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+ Fn(a − h − η)

g(η)dη
= 1 − δ + δPr[υn−1 < a]
Total private returns to ﬁrms in the training sector are given by
Rf = E[υn − υn−1|υn−1 ≥ δa]Pr[υn−1 ≥ δa]
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20A.2 The level of training, the size of the market and the probability that
workers leave the industry



















log(F(δa − h − η)Fn(δa − h − η)g(η)dη ≤ 0
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